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from the overall luster of the book. The quality of
of
from
scholarship is vety
very high.
high.
Blum's scholarship
In sum, Islands
IslandsofAgreement
ofAgreementis
conIn
is aa very useful conto the literature on
on conflict management
management
tribution to
and resolution. Blum has provided a helpful conceptual framework for thinking about the differbetween
ent types of agreements that develop between
long-term rivals. She argues persuasively that the
outbenefits of islands of agreement generally outand that most islands do not
weigh the costs and
unduly prolong conflict by making it more tolercase studies not only support her
able. Her three case
political-historiargument, but also are engaging political-historiIt would be interestcal essays in their own right. It
efficacy of
ing to read Blum's thoughts on the efficacy
of
"islands" in other contextsespecially the
"islands"
contexts-especially
broader Arab-Israeli conflict, which one might
might
hope to be the topic of a future book. For now,
Islands
ofAgreement is good reading for anyone
Islands ofAgreement
interested in the geology of peacemaking.
GEOFFREY R. WATSON
WATSON
GEOFFREYR.

The Catholic
Catholic University
University ofAmerica
War: The Future
ofJustice
Law and the Long War:
Future of
Justice in the
Age of
Terror.By Benjamin
Benjamin Wittes. New York:
ofTerror.

Penguin Press, 2008. Pp. 305. Index. $25.95.
$25.95.
Assessing Damage,
UrgingAction. By the Eminent
Damage, Urging
Eminent
Jurists Panel on Terrorism,
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism
Counter-terrorism
and Human
Human Rights. Geneva: International
Commission of Jurists, 2009. Pp. 199. At
Commission
At
http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/EJP-Report.pdf.
http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/EJP-Report.pdf.
Two
effectively
Two timely and powerful works effectively
frame the legal and political
political debates
debates about concontemporary
counterterrorism strategy,
temporary counterterrorism
strategy, particularly
particularly
in the
the United
United States. Read
Read together, they
they also raise
essential questions about
the most
most essential
about the nature
nature of
of
the threats to peace
peace and security. Benjamin Wittes
has written
written the energetic
energetic and thought-provoking
thought-provoking
Law and the Long
War. And a panel
Long War.
panel of Eminent
Eminent
Jurists of the International
Commission
of
Jurists
International Commission of}urists
(Panel) has produced
a
substantial
and
hard-hitproduced substantial
ting
ting report
report that
that assesses the
the damage
damage done
done in the
conduct
of
the
so-called
war
on
terror.
Like
conduct
war
and
and aa massive
massive flow
flow of
of civilians
civilians from
from south
south Lebanon
Lebanon to

the
the north,
north, Hezbollah
Hezbollah was
was still
still able
able to
to fire
fire Katyusha
Karyusha rockrockets
~ts into
in~o its
its northern
n~nhern. territory."
terriro7,'" Should
Should there
there be
be an
an
"after"
after before
before "aa massive
massive flow"?
flow ?
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103

Wittes, the Panel focuses on the suitability of the
Wittes,
architecture for responding
responding to the
the threats
legal architecture
transnational terrorist networks. While
posed by transnational
While
that the Bush administration's polWittes argues that
icies failed mostly for domestic political reasons,
the Panel concludes that they were bound to fail,
based as they were on a misguided belief that the
scale and scope of the terrorist threat was unprecdemanded significant deviations
edented and demanded
rule-of-law system upon which states
from the rule-of-Iaw
have long relied for their security. For the Panel,
the conduct of a "war on terror" itself constitutes
ever posed to the interone of the gravest threats ever
national legal system.
Although not trained as a lawyer, Wittes is a
of the U
U.S.
legal system who has
longtime observer ofthe
.S.legal
written an important and insightful study of the
"war
terror." A
A senior
senior fellow
"war on
on terror."
fellow at the Brookings
Institution and formerly an editorial writer for the
Washington Post,
Post,Wittes writes widely on COntrocontroWashington
versial
legal affairs. In previous
proposed
versiallegal
previous books he proposed
eliminating live confirmation
confirmation hearings for federal
judges and praised the conduct of Kenneth Starr's
investigation ofPresident Bill Clinton. In Law and
intellect
War, Wittes has turned his lively intellect
the Long War,
to analyze the ways that the United States should
should
accused
investigate, detain, interrogate, and try
try accused
Terror." Finding the
terrorists in the "Age of Terror."
efforts to date deficient,
deficient, Wittes proposes
proposes a new
constitution for the war on terrorism"
"kind of
ofconstitution
terrorism" (p.
145).
145). In framing his argument, Wittes embraces
the Bush administration's characterizations
characterizations about
about
revolutionary nature and
terrorist
the revolutionary
and scope
scope of the terrorist
threat, while rejecting some of its means
means for
for
addressing that threat.
Wittes
Wittes stakes out a position
position as a serious
serious "consequentialist."
Because
it
underlies
his methodolquentialist." Because
methodology,
the
philosophy
ogy,
philosophy of this "consequentialist"
"consequentialist"
approach
approach calls out for aa more explicit
explicit definition.
definition. I
take it to mean
mean that the merits
merits of actions
actions should
should
be
be evaluated
evaluated in light
light of,
of, or at least
least not without
without
regard to, their
consequences. In its
their immediate
immediate consequences.
robust
robust form, this approach
approach reads like
like a variation
variation of
of
Hobbes's
Hobbes's philosophy
philosophy that
that the ends of national
security
securityjustify
justifyvirtually
virtually any means that
that are
are reasonreasonably
ably tailored
tailored to
to the
the necessity. In
In its watered-down
watered-down
form,
form, itit may mean
mean merely
merely that
that policies should
should not
not
be formulated, nor
nor actions
actions taken (or foresworn),
foresworn),
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regard to the gravity
without regatd
gravity of their conseconseinsuffiquences. Bright
Bright lines
lines leave policymakers insufficient space
space in which
which to maneuver.
maneuver.
To establish
establish this position, Wittes treads
treads a narrow, sometimes
sometimes winding path between
between positions
taken by the Bush administration and those of
of
human rights advocates,
advocates, civil libertarians, and the
detainees'
might
detainees' lawyers. For instance,
instance, because it might
outrageously effective attacks
have prevented
prevented the outrageously
of 9/11, warrantless wiretapping ofU.S.
of U.S. persons
of9/11,
persons is
both necessary and ethically
ethically defensible:
defensible: the "government should have relatively easy access to telecommunications and other data, the mining of
of
communications
which has an essential
essential role to play in combating
terrorism
transnational threats" (p.
terrorism and other transnational
224).
224). We simply need Congress to provide
enabling
enabling legislation
legislation that includes a few safeguards
safeguards
to ensure that the information is not abused.
for
Wittes may well be correct
correct about the need for
access,
access, but he provides little evidence in support
support of
of
his position. As this reviewer sees the situation, the
intelligence
intelligence community had access to information
information
sufficient
sufficient to thwart the 9/11 attacks, and to the
extent its members believed that they were unable
unable
to share or use that information,
been
information, laws have been
revised. Wittes rests his argument on a "thought
"thought
experiment[:]
whether a year after the
experiment[:] ask yourself
yourselfwhether
next horrific attack, anyone will still be arguing
against [a warrantless
program]," and
warrantless wiretapping program],"
and
he sees the Foreign Intelligence
Intelligence Surveillance Act of
of
"represent[ing] an approach that captured
captured
1978 as "represent[ing]
the zeitgeist of
its moment-but
ofits
moment- but it is a moment
moment in
which many Americans no longer live" (p. 228).
This thought
thought experiment
experiment embodies my principal concern
concern about the book. It postulates
postulates a threat
threat
of unprecedented
unprecedented scope and scale, one capable of
of
completely
completely overwhelming
overwhelming the existing security
apparatus
apparatus and society's
sociery's own capacity for resilience.
Working
Working from the assumption that his characterization
ization of the threat is accurate, Wittes
Wittes identifies
significant
significant gaps in the government's legal
legal authority to collect
potentially
useful
information,
collect
information, and
he proposes remedies
and
protective
remedies
protective measures
measures that
appear
appear entirely
entirely sensible. But is his axiom correct?
Does the terrorist
terrorist threat necessitate
necessitate a revolution in
the nation's constitutional
constitutional order?
counterterrorism
Among the consequences
consequences of counterterrorism
policy
contemplate are
policy that Wittes seems not to contemplate

809

the secondary
secondary effects of U.S. policy
policy and practices
upon the rest of the world. While accepting
accepting that a
successful response to Al
AI Qaeda requires a "long
of law, Wittes fails to address
war" and a new body oflaw,
the unintended
consequences of these innovaunintended consequences
tions. His new architecture
architecture would create a civil system of
preventive detention that suspends the preofpreventive
In
sumption of innocence and much due process. In
his view, opposition
opposition to this measure
measure is "almost certainly delusional"
158). He would eliminate
delusional" (p. 158).
judicial review of government
government actions that affect
aliens abroad, accept the moral costs of extraordiextraordinary renditions, and legitimate
itself. He
legitimate torture itself.
constitution for
explains that we are building
building "a
"a constitution
for
the war on terrorism"
terrorism" (p. 145). This structure
would stand
stand separate
separate from ordinary law and the
law of war to "avoid
"avoid seepage of legal doctrines
devised for terrorism
terrorism into domains that already
have coherent
coherent bodies oflaw
of law oftheir
of their own" (p. 146).
Wittes expands on this hopeful distinction:
distinction: "we
don't want the nastiness we may sometimes tolerinterrogations in this conflict to
to become
ate in interrogations
acceptable
acceptable treatment
treatment for American
American service
service members caught by foreign nations under the laws of
of
146-47). If only
war" (pp. 146-47).
only nonmilitary
nonmilitary intelligence operatives
operatives torture, then the Geneva
Geneva Conventions continue to protect
soldiers.
In short,
protect
Wittes shares with prominent members
members of the
Bush administration
an
inability
administration inability or unwillingness
to account
account for the unintended, but inevitable, consequences of establishing a regime that employs
"nastiness."
"nastiness."
As others have noted, and contrary
contrary to the overall
overall
thrust of Wittes's argument, America's
America's influence
consequently its interests are dramatically
dramatically
and consequently
undermined
perception that it
undermined by the widely held perception
acts unilaterally, imperiously, or just hypocritihypocritically. Instead
Instead of acting
acting in ways that would isolate
Al Qaeda, the United States' disregard for internaAI
tional law and institutions has drawn recruits,
recruits,
sympathizers, and funds for the extremist groups.
sympathizers,
Moreover,
Moreover, unilateralism
unilateralism undermines the universality of
hard-won
ofhard-won rule-of-law norms that contribute so significantly
significantly to the fragile process of civilization. Wittes overlooks the distinct
distinct possibility
that the long war-or even a clash of civilizations-might
tions-might become
become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
consequences
As the Panel notes, these adverse consequences
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have
have taken a considerable
considerable toll on human rights and
on other critical objectives
objectives and interests
interests around
around
the world.
Warhas
In some ways, LawandtheLong
Law andthe Long War
has already
illustration
been overtaken
overtaken by events. One good illustration
concerns the election
ran
election of Barack Obama, who ran
on a platform of change and a promise to close
Guantinamo. Obama dropped
Guantanamo.
dropped the phrases
"unlawful enemy combatants" and "war on
"unlawful enemy
combatants" and
terror," and started to bring terrorist suspects to trial
1
in federal district court. 1 These changes
changes have
the debate within Amersurely altered the terms of
ofthe
ica and the world, though they have not therefore
mooted the purpose and point ofLawandtheLong
of Law andthe Long
War. The fight against terrorism may yet prove to
to
War.
Wittes's conceptualization,
polbe a long one, and Wittes's
conceptualization, policy concerns, and strategic choices may yet prove
to be an essential
essential part of the fight. But if these
issues prove
the faulty
prove to be mostly the products of
ofthe
understanding
understanding and missteps of the Bush administration, then the book's utility will be short-lived.
Only time will tell.
The case of Boumediene v. Bush22 provides
another good illustration of events
events outpacing
outpacing the
analysis in Law and the Long War.
War. Lakhdar
Lakhdar Boumediene was a Guantinamo
Guanranamo Bay detainee who
argued that Congress lacked
lacked the capacity
capacity to deny
Wittes's
his constitutional
constitutional right to habeas corpus. Wittes's
book went
went to press
press after the Supreme
Supreme Court heard
oral arguments
arguments but before
before it issued its decision
decision recognizing Boumediene's constitutional
constitutional right and
rejecting
Wittes's arguments
rejecting some of Wines's
arguments about the
rights ofsecurity
of security detainees and the role of
courts in
in
ofcourts
determining those rights. Nevertheless,
determining
Nevertheless, as a longtime and well-informed
well-informed court watcher, Wittes
observations about
offers some trenchant
trenchant observations
about the separation of powers in the formation of national
security policy. He clearly explains
explains the limitations
of policymaking
by
judges.
Typically, they have
policymaking
no expertise in intelligence, national
national security, military
affairs,
or
policymaking.
They generally canitaty
not choose
the
cases
that
come
before them or
choose
or
when. Their access to information is, as a practical
Mark R. Shulman, The "War
"War on Terror"
Terror"Is OverOverI' Mark
Now What? Restoring
Restoringthe Four
Four Freedoms
Freedoms as a Foundation
Foundation
for
and Security, 3].
3 J. NAT'L
NAT'L SEC.
SEC. L &
& POL'Y
263
fOr Peace
Peace and
POL'y 263
(2009).
2 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
2 128 S.Cr. 2229 (2008).
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[Vol. 103

matter, limited to what the parties present. And
And
traditional
traditional judicial canons
canons force judges to narrow
narrow
their decisions
decisions in ways that may treat parties fairly
ill-considered systems.
but create ill-considered
systems. 3 Because
Because of
ofthese
these
constraints, Wittes
Wines would keep these cases
cases out of
of
the courts. Although he recognizes some of the
failures of the Bush administration,
administration, as well as the
constitutional problems inherent in its efforts to
formulate policy insulated
insulated from the other
branches, Wittes blames Congress
Congress for failing to
step in to establish
establish more legitimate and effective
policies. He claims that

in the war on terrorism, Congress
Congress has done
very nearly the opposite
opposite of countering the
executive's
It
executive's rather considerable
considerable ambitions. It
has run from its own powers on questions on
on
which its assertion of rightful authority
would be helpful, and it has sloughed offthe
off the
difficult
difficult choices onto the two branches
branches less
capable
capable than itself of designing
designing new systems
11)
for novel problems. (P. 11)
Notwithstanding
Wittes's suggestion
Notwithstanding Wines's
suggestion that itit
was not assertive enough, in reality Congress
Congress has
been remarkably active over the past eight years
(albeit largely in line with the legislative agenda
agenda of
of
the Bush administration).
administration). Within the first few
years following 9/11,
9/11, it issued the sweeping
Authorization
Authorization for the Use of Military Force and
took the unprecedented
pre-authorizing
unprecedented step of pre-authorizing
war against Iraq. In order
order to detain
detain and interrointerrocurtailed
gate those in U.S. custody, Congress
Congress curtailed
the due process
process protections
protections of immigrants and
passed the Detainee Treatment
Treatment Act and then the
Military Commissions
Commissions Act, delegating
delegating to the presMilitary
ident
ident virtually every constitutionally
constitutionally permissible
power (and then some, it has been argued).
argued). In
In
intelligence from people
order to permit gathering
gathering intelligence
people
not in custody, it revised the Foreign Intelligence
3
Owen Fiss, The
ofMinimalism, THEORETITHEORETI3 Owen Fiss,
The Perils
Perils ofMinima/ism,
no. 2, 2008, Arr.
Art. 13 (2008)
(showing "how minimal
minimalism
ism has led to legislative
legislative enactments that deprive
of basic rights and that,
deprive the prisoners ofbasic
as a practical
practical matter, compromise
compromise the capacity
capacity of the
Supreme
Supreme Court ever to adequately
adequately address the [detainees'] claims.");
V1adeck, The Long War,
War, The
claims."); Stephen I. Vladeck,

CAL INQUIRIES
INQUIRIES IN
IN L.,
CAL

Federal
Courts, and the Necessity/Legality
Necessity/Legality Paradox
Federa/ Courts,
Paradox 43 U.
RICH.
REV. (2009) (review
RiCH. L. REv.
(review essay of Law andtheLong
War, taking a critical view of Wittes's narrative
War,
narrative of the
role of the courts in shaping U.S. counterterrorism
counterterrorism policies).
icies).
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Surveillance Act
Act of 1978, gave
gave amnesty to teleteleSurveillance
communications companies that
that had complied
communications
with extralegal orders to provide
provide information,
information, and
and
Act that tore
tore down barpassed the USA PATRIOT Act
intelligence sharing among agencies. It
It has
has
riers to intelligence
numerous laws to tackle terrorist
terrorist
also passed numerous
of a trillion dolfinancing and authorized in excess ofa
lars to make America safe. From this record, one
might well conclude not that Congress has been
its duties, but that it is responding as it
shirking its
of
sees fit and in accordance with the requirements of
democratic process.
the Constitution and the democratic
Wittes acknowledges, had PresMoreover, and as Wines
ident Bush escaped the constraints imposed by his
unitary
unitary executive theory, he might well have
requested
requested and received
received even more tools from Congress.
Wittes complains about congressional
When Wines
inactivity
inactivity or judicial hyperactivity, his actual
actual complaint, though not stated in these terms, is that our
eighteenth-century Constitution is unfit for meeteighteenth-century
ing the terrorist threat. That Constitution has survived, however,
however, for over two centuries,
centuries, during
of
which the nation has faced an astonishing range of
threats. Arguably,
greatest
Arguably, the Civil War posed the greatest
threat to the Union. Thirteen states seceded. The
war killed more Americans
Americans than all other wars
combined. In the face of this truly unprecedented
unprecedented
threat to the nation's
security,
the
Supreme
nation's
Supreme Court
concluded
the
1866
case
of
Ex
parte
concluded
1866
parte Milligan
Milligan as
as
follows:

The Constitution of the United States is a
law for rulers and people, equally in war and
and
in peace,
its propeace, and covers
covers with
with the shield
shield of
ofits
tection all classes
classes of men, at all times and
and
under
under all circumstances.
circumstances. No doctrine,
involving
involving more
more pernicious
pernicious consequences,
consequences,
was ever
ever invented by the wit ofman
ofman than
than that
that
any of
its provisions can be suspended
ofits
suspended during
any of the
the great
great exigencies
exigencies of
of government.
government.
Such
Such a doctrine leads directly
directly to anarchy
anarchy or
or
despotism,
on
despotism, but the theory of necessity on
which it is based is false; for the government,
government,
within the Constitution, has all the powers
granted
granted to it, which
which are necessary
necessary to preserve
preserve
its existence; as
as has been
been happily proved
proved by
by
the
great
effort
to
throw
off
its
the result
result of the
the
great
effort
throw
off
4
just
just authority.
authority.4
4471
71 U.S.
120-21.
U.S. (4
(4 Wall)
Wall) 2,
2,120-21.
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Significantly, the Civil War experience gave
gave the
the
no reason to trim back civil rights. ConConnation no
occasion, instead, to expand them
gress used the occasion,
by passing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
Fourteenth, and FifFifby
teenth Amendments.
Damage, Urging
Urging
When we turn to Assessing Damage,
Action, it is immediately apparent that the Eminent Jurists see the world in a much different way
Wittes. Much like the Radical Republicans
than Wines.
Congress in the 1860s,
1860s, the Panel
who dominated Congress
recognition ofhuman
of human dignity as the key to
sees the recognition
security, progress, and prosperity. Chaired by
African Chief Justice Arthur
former South African
Chaskalson, who had in 1963 served
served on Nelson
Chaskalson,
Mandela's
Mandela's defense team, the Panel included
included
diverse judges, lawyers, and academics with firstclass credentials in human rights and humanitarian affairs: Georges Abi-Saab (Egypt), Robert
Robert
Goldman (United States), HinaJilani
Goldman
(Pakistan),
Hina Jilani (Pakistan),
Robinson
Vitit Muntarbhorn (Thailand), Mary Robinson
Trechsel
Rafil
(Ireland), Stefan
Stefan T
rechsel (Switzerland),
(Switzerland), and RaUl
Zaffaroni
Zaffaroni (Argentina). Other
Other than Robinson, who
served with distinction as president of Ireland,
none appears to have significant military
military or executive
experience.
The
International
International Commission
Commission
utive
secretariat staff supported
of Jurists secretariat
supported the Panel,
which launched
launched its global study in 2005. Panel
members
members and staff convened
convened public
public and private
collecting first-hand
first-hand
every continent,
continent, collecting
hearings on every
information
counterterrorism
information on experiences with counterterrorism
campaigns
campaigns over the past forty years. They met
publicly with leaders
the bench and bar, human
leaders of
ofthe
rights activists, academics, and other members of
of
the public.
public. Privately, they met with a wide swath
swath
ofgovernment
ofgovernment officials.
officials. While
While the particular
particular focus
was the ongoing
ongoing campaigns
campaigns against Al
AI Qaeda and
and
its affiliates, the Panel
Panel took
took in aa great
great deal ofinformation about earlier
earlier counterterrorism
counterterrorism campaigns
campaigns
around the
the world. Culling
Culling through
through many thouthousands of pages
of
notes
and
records
(many
posted
pages of
records
posted
now on the commission's
commission's Web
Web site), the staff
drafted
drafted while Panel members commented
commented and
and
edited. Notwithstanding
Notwithstanding this cumbersome
cumbersome process,
cess, the resulting
resulting report offers
offers aa pellucid
pellucid assault
assault
on the concept
strategy of
the so-called
concept and
and strategy
ofthe
so-called war
war on
on
terror. Steeped
Steeped in the
the historical
historical record
record and
and
unafraid
unafraid of veering
veering into
into political
political issues,
issues, the Panel
Panel
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takes as its basic tenet that "any implied dichotomy
omy between securing
securing people's rights and people's
people's
security is wrong. Upholding human rights is not
a matter of being 'soft'
'soft' on terrorism" (p. 16). The
25).
report concludes:
concludes: "It is time for change" (p. 25).
The Panel's conclusions are readily
readily summarized. While
While flatly rejecting the concept of a "war
acknowledge that terrorism
on terror,"
terror," they acknowledge
terrorism poses
to
serious threats and that states must strive to
counter it. But since 9/11, states have demonstrated a worrying propensity
hard-won
propensity to discard hard-won
legal institutions
that
had
previously
done
much
institutions
much
to ensure security. By deviating from ordinary
criminal law and undermining
undermining international
international law,
counterproducthese states
states are acting
acting in gravely
gravely counterproductive ways. They fail to employ
employ the most powerful
tools for addressing
addressing terrorist
terrorist threats, and they
undermine their own legitimacy-in
undermine
legitimacy-in effect, feeding the discontent that nourishes terrorism. Morehistorical record reveals a trend that conover, the historical
solidating power in the executive leads to abuses
counterterrorism
having nothing to do with the counterterrorism
agenda.
need
The Panel
Panel rejects the notion that states need
new legal paradigms or tools in order to counter
counter
the threat of transnational
transnational terrorist networks.
Most of the "change" that the Panel
Panel intends
intends to
effect is, as one might therefore expect, a return to
to
pre-9/ 11 norms of
international and domestic
the pre-9/
ofinternational
domestic
law. In short, the rule of law remains the most
most
counterterrorism tool; derogations from
effective counterterrorism
from
consequences. They
it produce seriously adverse consequences.
undermine the overall effectiveness
effectiveness of the rule-ofundermine
of hatred and violence.
law system and feed cycles ofhatred
Although written
written without
without reference
reference to Law and
War, the Panel's report frequently seems
the Long War,
like an effort to refute
refute the premises upon
upon which
which
Wittes
Wittes wrote and the policies that he seeks to promote. The Panel focuses on the cyclical dynamics
of violence and brutality. In contrast,
contrast, Wittes
implies that the consequences
of
violence can be
consequences violence
wholly
beneficial
and
fully
contained.
His book
book
wholly beneficial
opens with
with a chilling story intended to shock the
reader out of
his smug "nonconsequentialism."
"nonconsequentialism." In
In
ofhis
the months following the close of World War II,
British soldiers searched
searched in vain for Rudolf Hoss,
Hoss,
commandant of Auschwitz.
the one-time commandant
Auschwitz. In due
course, they located his wife, who refused to propro-

[Vol. 103
103
(Vol.

vide information
information about his location. To compel
her to give up her husband, the British
British threatened
to render their son to the Soviet Union. Forced to
choose between
between the lives of her husband and her
her
H6ss capitulated. Her husband
husband was
son, Frau Hoss
quickly captured, and after serving
serving as a witness at
at
governNuremberg, he was tried by the Polish government and hanged
hanged on gallows specially
specially constructed
constructed
on the ground
ground of the former concentration
concentration camp
camp
that he had commanded.
For Wittes, the suffering that Frau H6ss
Hoss experienced
rienced during this interrogation
interrogation was outweighed
outweighed
by the benefit that society received through the
capture of her husband. For this reviewer, the
Hbss incident
Hoss
incident raises a number of other considerations, including: how to weigh the value of information; the definition
definition of cruel, inhumane, and
and
noncombatants;
degrading treatment; the roles of noncombatants;
transitional justice. It also
and the mechanics
mechanics of transitional
also
brings into sharp focus the contrast
contrast between
between technical expediency and due process,
process, between capturing a heinous criminal and abiding by the stanof civilization. In the long run, is civilization
dards ofcivilization.
civilization
better offallowing
offallowing some mass murderers
murderers to escape,
escape,
recognizing that such is the price of maintaining a
recognizing
robust system of the rule of law? From Wittes's
perspective,
Hoss served as a
perspective, what matters is that H6ss
valuable
valuable witness at Nuremberg and was then exeordeal-as engineered
engineered and carcuted; Frau H6ss's
Hoss's ordeal-as
personnel-was no
ried out by British
British military
military personnel-was
more than the collateral
collateral effect of a process that
that
achieved a worthy objective. Wittes writes that he
thanks God that the British soldiers had been willing to subject Frau Hoss to this ordeal
ordeal (p. 3).
3). His
effects that trougratitude glosses over the kind of
ofeffects
Hss, the
ble the Panel. What happened
happened to Frau Hoss,
British soldiers, their families, and their commucommunities? What effect did this kind of action have on
on
the development
development of a postwar
postwar system of justice?
What signals did it send (and continue
send
continue to send
through his retelling) about who we are and who
we should be? Moreover, by focusing attention
attention on
on
one event in which the desired outcome
outcome was
of the villain),
achieved (the capture and execution ofthe
about
are we missing one or possibly many stories about
other wives who were mistreated in vain, either
either
husbands'
because they would not reveal their husbands'
whereabouts or because they had been telling
telling the
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truth all along? What about the documented incidents of innocent people being tortured to death
or of torture actually hindering
hindering the gathering of
of
intelligence?
intelligence? Wittes does not address these kinds
to
of questions. Instead, he encourages the reader to
wonder whether there might be other instances
brutality would make the world
ofbrutality
when a measure
measure of
a much better place.
The Panel, unlike Wittes, addresses
addresses these kinds
of questions by examining the systemic
of
systemic effects
effects of
counterterrorism
counterterrorism regimes from recent history,
focusing mainly on the experiences of Northern
Northern
Ireland,
Ireland, Argentina, and Peru. The Panel observes
that Great Britain's
Britain's efforts to suppress political
extremism
extremism in Northern Ireland succeeded only
when it suspended its own role in perpetuating
perpetuating the
cycle
"failed
abandoned "failed
cycle of violence. London abandoned
detention
of
detention policies"
policies" that had driven hundreds of
young men into forming a highly efficient
efficient insurgency force, and it abandoned the special
special purpose
Diplock
Diplock Courts and restored a legal system with all
the protections of due process
process and substantive
criminal
criminal law. This course correction
correction enabled
enabled London to halt processes that were
were corrupting the
of law and to start an authentic peace
British rule oflaw
process
process for Northern Ireland.
Ireland. During
During the late
twentieth
twentieth century,
centuty, states
states across
across South America
America
and South Asia had to learn similar, equally painpainful
lessons. Many had themselves
fullessons.
themselves been feeding terror through their own brutal
brutal policies.
Eight years after 9/11, the legal
legal framework for
for
transnational terrorism
oftransnational
responding to the threat of
contending
remains hotly contested. With their contending
visions, these two works-Wittes's
works-Wittes's Law and the
the
Long War
War and the Panel's Assessing Damage,
Damage,
Urging Action-outline
Action-outline the terms of this vital
Urging
thoughtdebate. Both are thoroughly researched,
researched, thoughtfully reasoned, and fearlessly argued. And as ofthis
of this
writing, it is unclear which vision will prevail.
MARK
SHULMAN
MARK R. SHULMAN
Pace
Pace University
University School ofLaw
Targeted KiLLing
Killing in International
Targeted
International Law. By Nils
Melzer. Oxford,
Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008. Pp. liv, 468.
468. Index. $130,
$130, £65,
£65,
cloth;
cloth; $60,
$60, £29.99, paper.
Few international
international law topics evoke such a vis"targeted killings."
ceral response
response as "targeted
killings." The attention
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paid them is somewhat
somewhat curious
curious since attacks must
must
actually be "targeted"
"targeted" if they are to comply with
the international
international humanitarian
humanitarian law (IHL). Article
1977'1 expressly
Protocol I of 1977
51.4 of Additional Protocol
provides
"indiscriminate attacks are prohibprovides that "indiscriminate
ited," explaining that they include those "which
...and conare not directed at a military objective ...
sequently ...
. . . are of a nature
nature to strike military
objectives
without
objectives and civilians
civilians or civilian
civilian objects without
The United
United States,
States, inter alia, is not a
distinction." The
Cusparty to Additional Protocol I. However, the Customary International
tomary
International Humanitarian
Humanitarian Law study
study of
of
International Committee of the Red Cross
the International
correctly asserts in Rules 11 and 12
12 that an
(ICRC) correctly
customary law for
analogous prohibition exists in customary
noninternational armed
both international
international and noninternational
armed
2
Human rights norms, binding in cerconflicts. 2 Human
of armed conflict and generally
circumstances ofarmed
tain circumstances
thereof, are equally
applicable in the absence
absence thereof,
demanding. There is no question that an attack
targeted violates international
international law.
that is not targeted
The crux ofthe
of the matter is, instead, who it is that
is targeted
targeted and in what circumstances.
circumstances. During
armed conflict, the rules are, at least textually,
straightforward. Article 48 ofAdditional Protocol
straightforward.
I,I, which applies in international
international armed
armed conflict,
conflict,
belligerents to "at all times distinguish
requires belligerents
distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants
...and accordingly
...direct their operations
...
accordingly ...
only against
against military
military objectives."
objectives." This broad
of disprinciple ofdisrestatement of the customary law principle
1: "The
operationalized in Article
Article 551:
tinction is operationalized
civilian population as such, as well as individual
attack." Howcivilians, shall not be the object
object of attack."
ever, the Protocol cautions that civilians lose this
protection from attack "for such time as they take
a direct part in hostilities."
hostilities." Common Article 3 to
the four 1949
Geneva
Conventions similarly for1949
Conventions
bids, in "conflicts
"conflicts not of an international
characinternational character,"
acts
of
"violence
to
life
and
person"
directed
ter,"
person"
at "persons
hostilities"-a
"persons taking no active part in hostilities"-a
l
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
I Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949,
1949, and Relating to the Protection
Protection of Victims ofInternational
of International Armed Conflicts, openedfor
openedfor signarims
signatureDec. 12,
12,1977,1125
16ILM
ture
1977, 1125 UNTS 3, reprinted
reprinted in 16
ILM
1391 (1977).
1391
22 11 CUSTOMARY
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARHUMANITARIAN LAW
37-43 (Jean-Marie
(Jean-Marie Henckaens
Henckaerts &
IAN
LAw 37-43
& Louise
Doswald-Beck eds.,
eds., 2005).
2005).
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